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Abstract
Duncan Pritchard (2010) and Krist Vaesen (Forthcoming) have
recently argued that robust virtue epistemology does not square
with the extended cognition thesis that has enjoyed an increas-
ing degree of popularity in recent philosophy of mind. This
paper shows that their arguments fail. The relevant cases of ex-
tended cognition pose no new problem for robust virtue epis-
temology. It is shown that Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases can
be dealt with in familiar ways by a number of virtue theories of
knowledge.
1 Introduction
The central thesis of virtue theories of knowledge is that knowledge
involves cognitive success that is due to an exercise of cognitive abil-
ity. Two versions of such theories can be distinguished. According to
the first, weak version, cognitive success due to ability is necessary
but insufficient for knowledge. As opposed to that, its robust cousin
strengthens the conditional into a biconditional:
[VER] One knows that p iff one’s cognitive success (typically: one’s
true belief that p) is due to the exercise of cognitive ability.
If it can be made to work, VER is a very appealing view in the the-
ory of knowledge. Apart from its obvious simplicity and elegance it
promises a neat account of the value of knowledge, one that explains
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why knowledge is more valuable than any proper subset of its parts1:
success due to ability is in general more valuable both than success
that isn’t due to ability and failure despite ability. According to VER,
knowledge is a special case of the general phenomenon. In conse-
quence, it can be said to inherit the value that attaches to success due
to ability in general.2
Yet, VER has opponents. There are a number of arguments in the
literature that purport to show that VER is false. For instance, Jen-
nifer Lackey (2007) and Duncan Pritchard (e.g. 2010) have argued on
the basis of cases involving knowledge by testimony that VER fails
left-to-right. Moreover, Jonathan Kvanvig (2003) and Pritchard (2010)
both argue that barn façade-style Gettier cases show that VER fails
right-to-left. I have defended VER against these attacks elsewhere
(Author 2009, 2011) and will not rehearse these arguments here. In-
stead, I will be concerned with a new kind of objection that has re-
cently been levelled against the view by Pritchard and Krist Vaesen.
Pritchard and Vaesen both adduce arguments to the effect that VER
does not fit well with the so-called “extended cognition thesis” (ECT),
according to which, at least in certain cases, an agent’s cognitive pro-
cesses extend beyond his skin. In what follows, I will show that these
arguments fail: ECT does not pose a special problem for VER.
2 The arguments from extended cognition
2.1 Vaesen
What exactly does it mean to say that an agent’s true belief is due to
the exercise of cognitive abilty? According to one prominent proposal
(due to Greco (e.g. 2003)), the answer is that the agent’s cognitive
abilities must play the most salient part in the causal explanation
of the agent’s believing the truth about the matter. It is VER thus
understood that is the target of Vaesen’s argument.
Let’s look at the details. Vaesen gives ECT a very weak interpreta-
tion, which is meant to make the thesis especially plausible and hence
his argument particularly compelling: all he needs for his argument
is the assumption that human cognition extends beyond our skin in
the sense that it “is strongly dependent on external resources.” (Vae-
sen Forthcoming: 7) Thus understood, ECT is indeed entirely uncon-
1 For more on the value problem see e.g. Kvanvig (2003) and Pritchard (2008).
2 For more on VER and the value of knowledge see e.g. Greco (2009; 2010),
Pritchard (2008) and Sosa (2003; 2007).
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troversial. After all, we do rely on thermometers to get into cognitive
contact with facts about temperature, rulers to get into cognitive con-
tact with facts about length etc.
Vaesen aims to show that, given this uncontroversial interpreta-
tion of ECT, VER fails left-to-right: there are cases in which, with the
aid of an external resource, one comes to know something, whilst,
at the same time, not having hit upon the truth because of ability.
In order to bring this point home, Vaesen invites us to consider the
following case:
Sissi. Sissi is a baggage inspector at the local airport. The X-ray
scanners at that airport have recently been upgraded to a type
that periodically superimposes images of illegal objects onto
the images actually produced by the scanner. This is because
research has shown that operators’ vigilance tends to drop by
almost 50% within half an hour of being presented with only
unsuspicious images. Upon viewing a suspicious image oper-
ators can click on the image to find out whether it is a “false
positive” produced by the scanner. Sissi has received instruc-
tions how to use the new system from her supervisor, Joseph,
who, incidentally, is also a cognitive engineer and was in charge
of designing the new type of scanner. Sissi inspects an item of
luggage that contains a bomb. Thanks to the new device her
vigilance is at peak level so that she forms the corresponding
true belief. (Vaesen Forthcoming: 9)
Intuitively, Sissi comes to know that there is a bomb in the suitcase.
However, argues Vaesen, her cognitive ability is not the most salient
feature in the causal explanation of her cognitive success. Rather,
what explains her cognitive success here is “a difference in the set-up
of the machinery”. (Forthcoming: 9) Here is Vaesen’s reason for this:
Since the old scanners have been upgraded only recently, Sissi might
very easily have operated one of the old scanners instead of a new
one. If Sissi had operated an old scanner, we may suppose, she would
have suffered from a lapse of attention and therefore formed a false
belief that the suitcase contains no bomb instead of the true belief
she actually forms. At the same time, she would have exercised the
same cognitive abilities to arrive at her belief as she does in the actual
world. What this brings to light, according to Vaesen, is that what
is most salient in the causal explanation of Sissi’s cognitive success
is the fact that the new scanners are in place, not that she exercised
cognitive ability. As a result, VER fails left-to-right.
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2.2 Pritchard
So much for Vaesen’s argument. Let’s move on to Pritchard’s. Ac-
cording to the version of VER that Pritchard considers, whether the
right-hand side of VER is satisfied can be determined by answering
the question whether the agent’s “cognitive success is primarily cred-
itable to [his] cognitive agency.”3
With these remarks about Pritchard’s understanding of VER in
play, let’s turn to the actual argument. Consider the following classic
example of extended cognition due to Clark and Chalmers (1998):
Otto. In order to counter his Alzheimer’s-induced loss of memory,
Otto starts using a notebook in which he stores and from which
he retrieves information in much the same way in which he
had hitherto stored information in and retrieved it again from
memory.
According to the extended cognition thesis, Otto’s notebook is a part
of his cognitive processes (when he uses it) in much the same way in
which other people’s memories are (when they use them).
The classic example does not constitute much of a difficulty for
VER. After all, Otto develops the notebook system himself so that
the cognitive successes he goes on to reap from it—such as, for in-
stance, believing truly that he has an appointment with the doctor
tomorrow—are primarily creditable to him. VER can accommodate
the intuition that various of the cognitive successes count as knowl-
edge.
However, argues Pritchard, there are variations of the case that
get VER in trouble. Thus consider:
Otto*. In order to counter his Alzheimer’s-induced loss of memory,
Otto’s wife sets Otto up with a notebook in which Otto is to
store and from which he is to retrieve information in much the
same way in which he had hitherto stored information in and
3 Pritchard (2010: 137, my italics). What is the relation between the version of
VER Pritchard discusses and the one that is the target of Vaesen’s argument? On
the face of it, they are different. After all, in Vaesen’s version, whether the agent
satisfies the right-hand side of VER depends on whether his abilities are the most
salient part in the causal explanation of his cognitive success, while in Pritchard’s
version, it depends on whether his cognitive success is “primarily creditable” to his
agency. It is not clear, however, that the difference between the two statements is
more than superficial. After all, plausibly, the agent’s cognitive success is primarily
creditable to his agency just in case his cognitive abilities are the most salient part
in the causal explanation of his cognitive success.
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retrieved it again from memory. Otto’s wife teaches Otto how
to use the notebook and plays a crucial part in ensuring that the
system functions effectively. (Pritchard 2010: 149)
In this case, claims Pritchard, it is “hard to judge” whether Otto’s
subsequent cognitive successes are primarily creditable to his cogni-
tive agency. After all, a third agent is crucially involved here. Still,
intuitively, many of these cognitive successes will count as knowl-
edge.
One might think that the fact that VER does not pass a clear ver-
dict on the case is not so bad for its champions. Unfortunately, how-
ever, things are worse than this. Pritchard argues that there is an
alternative view that delivers the intuitively correct verdicts. If so,
the cases provide some reason to prefer the alternative view to VER.
The alternative Pritchard has in mind is the weaker version of virtue
epistemology that claims that the ability condition is necessary but
insufficient for knowledge. According to Pritchard, the way to test
whether the ability condition of the weaker view is met is to ask
whether the agent’s true belief is to a significant degree creditable to
the exercise of ability.4 It is plausible that, even when Otto’s wife has
helped him set up the system, his subsequent cognitive successes are
to a significant degree creditable to the exercise of cognitive ability
on his part (at least in cases in which they also qualify as knowledge).
So, there is an alternative to VER that can easily handle the cases for
which VER does not manage to pass a clear verdict. As a result these
cases constitute evidence against VER.
3 No new problem
In order to show that neither Vaesen’s nor Pritchard’s argument is
successful, I will now argue that the force of neither argument de-
pends on the cases being cases of extended cognition. Rather, what
gives the arguments bite is a familiar fact about the context-sensitivity
of salience/attributions of primary creditability.
Consider, first, a case in which Otto acquires some true belief
with the help of his notebook—say, that he has an appointment with
4 Notice that the weaker test is not an option for the defender of VER. After all,
since VER gives not only necessary but also sufficient conditions for knowledge,
it must be able to handle Gettier cases. Crucially, however, in many Gettier cases,
the agent’s cognitive success is still to a significant degree creditable to the exercise
of ability. If VER were combined with the weaker test, it would pass the wrong
verdicts in at least some Gettier cases.
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the doctor tomorrow. Now consider two conversational contexts in
which the case is discussed. In the first one we hold fixed that Otto is
operating a properly functioning notebook system. Facts about how
he acquired the system and how the system is sustained are not up
for debate. Rather, the focus is on the contribution of Otto’s cognitive
abilities to his cognitive success. Since Otto knows how to operate
the system, in this context, we will be inclined to give Otto primary
credit for the cognitive successes he attains by using the notebook.
As opposed to that, in the second context, the focus is shifted to the
contribution of his wife to the functionality of the system. Here, we
are inclined to assign at least some of the credit for the successes
attained by means of the system to the helpful influence of his wife.
Moreover, the more we stress his wife’s involvement, the more credit
we will be inclined to assign to her and, of course, the less we will be
inclined to give Otto primary credit.
A similar argument can be run for the case of Sissi: If we hold
fixed that she is operating a new type of scanner and focus on the
contribution of Sissi’s abilities to her cognitive success, we will be
inclined to single out Sissi’s cognitive abilities as the most salient
part of the causal explanation of her success. Not so if the focus is on
the relative merits of the old and the new types of scanner.
Notice, next, that the same goes for cases of regular, non-extended
cognition. Consider:
Otto**. Otto is in possession of a cognitive system that plays the
role that memory plays for most of us not because his wife has
helped him get set up with a notebook, but because his doctor
regularly administers a novel kind of medication that keeps the
effects of Alzheimer’s at bay.
In a conversational context in which it is held fixed that Otto’s mem-
ory is fully and properly functioning, in which facts about how this
happens are not up for debate and in which we focus on the contri-
bution of Otto’s cognitive abilities to his cognitive success, we will be
inclined to give Otto primary credit for the cognitive successes he at-
tains through the use of his memory. As opposed to that, in a context
in which we shift the focus to the contribution of the doctor to the
functionality of Otto’s memory, we will be inclined to assign credit
for Otto’s successes to the doctor. The more we stress the doctor’s in-
volvement, the more credit we will be inclined to assign to him and,
of course, the less we will be inclined to give Otto primary credit.
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Now consider the following variation of Sissi:
Sissi*. When inspecting the bomb Sissi’s vigilance is at peak level not
because she is using the new type of scanner but because the
staff at the local airport are given a novel vigilance-increasing
drug that Sissi’s supervisor Joseph developed in his free time.
If we hold fixed that Sissi is taking the vigilance increasing drug and
focus on the contribution of Sissi’s abilities to her cognitive success,
we will be inclined to single out Sissi’s cognitive abilities as the most
salient part of the causal explanation of her success. Not so if we shift
the focus to the contribution the drug (or Joseph) makes to keeping
up Sissi’s vigilance.
There is thus reason to believe that Vaesen’s and Pritchard’s cases
pose a problem for VER not in virtue of being cases of extended
cognition but in virtue of the fact that salience and attributability of
primary credit are context-sensitive in a way in which knowledge at-
tributions appear not to be. The good news for defenders of VER is
that this is a familiar difficulty for (certain versions of) VER rather
than a novel one. It is no surprise, then, that the familiar responses
to this problem will work for the extended cognition cases as well.
In the remainder of the paper, I will briefly review some lines of re-
sponse and show how they deal with Pritchard’s and Vaesen’s cases.
4 Some virtue theoretic responses reviewed
The first response I would like to look at is due to Greco (2007; 2008),
who addresses the problem by (1) offering VER as a contextualist
account of knowledge attributions and (2) adopting Edward Craig’s
(1990) thesis that the function of the concept of knowledge is to flag
good informants. If Craig’s thesis holds, then, plausibly, in the con-
text of a knowledge attribution we are in the context of picking out
a good informant on the issue under consideration. What matters
in such a context, however, is merely that the agent has a properly
functioning cognitive system of the relevant sort and how he oper-
ates it, not how this system has been acquired or how it is sustained.
As a result, Greco can argue that, in contexts in which we are in the
business of making an attribution of knowledge, the focus will be on
the contribution of the agent’s abilities to his cognitive success, not
on how the relevant cognitive system has been acquired or how it is
sustained. Since, as we have seen above, in such contexts both Otto
7
and Sissi get primary credit for their cognitive successes/their cog-
nitive abilities are the most salient part of the causal explanation of
their successes, Greco can avoid the problem under consideration.5
Another way of dealing with the problem is to opt for a different
way of spelling out the because of relation at issue in VER’s cru-
cial ability condition. The proposal I favour here is in essence the
one offered by Ernest Sosa (2007; Forthcoming).6 According to Sosa,
what matters to satisfaction of the ability condition is whether the
agent’s cognitive success manifests ability on his part, where an abil-
ity, according to Sosa, “is a disposition . . . that would in appropri-
ately normal conditions ensure (or make highly likely) the success of
any relevant performance issued by it.” (Sosa 2007: 29)
Let’s see what verdicts Sosa’s version of VER passes on Vaesen’s
and Pritchard’s cases. When Sissi is operating a new scanner and
forms a true belief that there is a bomb in the suitcase, does she man-
ifest a disposition that would ensure that she believes truly in appro-
priately normal conditions? Arguably, the answer here is “yes”. After
all, when operating a new scanner, Sissi has a disposition that would
ensure that she forms true beliefs about the presence of bombs. And
it is this disposition that she manifests when she forms her true belief.
So, Sissi’s belief satisfies the right-hand side of Sosa’s version of VER
(and, of course, does so whether or not the conversational context is
5 It may be worth noting that in contexts in which we focus on Otto’s wife’s
contribution to his cognitive success or on the relative merits of the new and old
scanner, the sentences “Otto knows that he has an appointment with the doctor
tomorrow” and “Sissi knows there is a bomb in the suitcase” are false. However,
this is arguably acceptable for Greco. After all, Greco offers VER as an account
of knowledge attributions. Such an account can be successful if it passes the right
verdict in all cases in which knowledge is intuitively correctly attributed. Craig’s
thesis allows him to secure this result by ensuring that contexts of knowledge
attributions are ones in which the focus is on the contribution of cognitive ability
to cognitive success.
6 That said, I do not agree with the version of VER Sosa goes on to adopt. I
adduce a number of arguments against it in Author (2011) and offer an alterna-
tive. The main difference between Sosa’s VER and the one I favour concerns the
nature of the cognitive success at issue in perceptual knowledge. While Sosa fol-
lows orthodoxy in holding that the relevant cognitive success at issue in perceptual
knowledge consists in hitting upon the truth, I argue for a more robust proposal
according to which the relevant cognitive success consists in the discrimination of
the object of perception from all other objects of perception in the agent’s environ-
ment. However, since I agree with Sosa on how to unpack the because of relation in
VER’s ability condition, these differences are of little consequence for the purposes
of this paper. For that reason, the two different accounts can, for the purposes of
this paper at least, be treated as one.
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set up in such a way that Sissi’s ability is what’s salient). Similarly,
in the case of Otto: when working with a fully functioning notebook
system, Otto has a disposition that would ensure or make highly
likely that he believes truly for instance that he has an appointment
with the doctor tomorrow. And it is precisely this disposition that
Otto manifests when he forms his true belief. Thus Otto’s belief also
satisfies the right-hand side of VER.7
5 Conclusion
It transpires that neither Vaesen’s nor Pritchard’s extended cogni-
tion cases poses a novel problem for VER. Rather, they instantiate
the familiar problem of context-sensitivity of salience/attributions of
primary creditability. As a result, it is no surprise that the familiar
virtue theoretic responses to this problem will do the job for virtue
epistemologists here as well. Once again, VER survives the attack of
its foes unscathed.
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